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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 10-2-65

Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM 1

CONCLUSIONS 1

DISCUSSION 4

I. THE SETTING 4

II. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES 6

III. MEANS AND METHODS 7

Military Assistance 8
Economic Aid 9
Trade 11
Cultural Relations 13
Communist Movements 13
The Covert Mechanism 19

IV. COMMUNIST PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 21

South Asia 21
The Arab World 24
Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus 28

V. SUMMING UP 29

ANNEX: THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (RIS) 33

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the nature, extent, and present effectiveness of Soviet and Chinese Communist overt and covert efforts in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,[1] and to estimate the outlook for such efforts over the next several years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Most of the countries in this area have been opened up to Soviet and other Communist penetration by the liquidation of European colonial empires and by the widespread emergence of movements of protest against the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small ruling class. Over the past decade or so, the USSR has injected itself dynamically into the whole area. China plays a significant role mainly in South Asia. With the exception of Yugoslavia, whose progress while maintaining a balance between the USSR and the West has greatly impressed certain leaders in the area, the East European countries have ridden into the area on Soviet coattails. (*Paras. 1-4*)

B. Soviet influence in the area has been achieved principally through the customary instruments of contemporary statecraft. With a considerable degree of success, Moscow has exploited nationalist and anti-colonial resentments, encouraged neutralist sentiment, and taken sides in local disputes. The USSR, and to a lesser extent China, have mounted cultural and student exchange programs and expanded their trade relationships. The Soviets have extended economic aid to 16 of the 23 countries in the area, and six of them have armies that are largely equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods.

[1] The following countries are included in this estimate: all the Arab states (including those in northern Africa, i.e., UAR, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Israel, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Ceylon.

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The economic and military aid programs have not only contributed to the Soviet image in the area, but also provide Moscow with some potential for leverage by slowing down projects, failing to deliver spares, and the like, though this leverage could not be exerted without some political cost. (*Paras. 9-20, 33*)

C. The overt Soviet presence—for example, diplomatic, trade, military missions—provides cover for an extensive clandestine apparatus. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) play a wide role in carrying out foreign policy. Aside from the classic intelligence collection functions, these services conduct operations to denigrate the US and other Western powers, to capture and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and to place individuals in positions in local governments, political parties, etc., where they can influence policy in Moscow's favor. The Soviets have recruited local officials at various levels, including some holding senior government positions. In general, the Soviet covert operations have been fairly successful. (*Paras. 26-32*)

D. The Communist nations also strive to develop and use local Communist movements and international front organizations. The former include a few sizable legal or quasi-legal organizations, as in India, Greece, and Cyprus, and a dozen or so small, mostly illegal, but fairly well organized parties. Their organizational strength has enabled them to survive repression and, on occasion, to make significant but temporary gains in the wake of political upheaval. On the whole, the Communist parties have made little progress as mass movements; they have done best in attracting discontented intellectuals, while making little headway among the peasants who comprise the bulk of the population, and only somewhat more among workers. This has led the Soviets, in some countries at least, to slacken their efforts to develop a mass organization and turn instead to a tactic of infiltrating ongoing nationalist or revolutionary movements. (*Paras. 21-25*)

E. In both overt and covert operations, the Soviets probably consider that they have met with a fair degree of success in establishing their presence and influence in the area. They have, broadly speaking, been most successful in the Arab world and least successful where fear of Slavic domination remains strong—in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. They will probably continue their efforts to establish an identity of feeling and interest with the modernizing forces in the "Third World," though tailoring their approach for individual countries.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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Some of the countries we are dealing with have adequately functioning political systems, sufficiently coherent societies, or strong enough leadership to be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies, barring a major upheaval. A number of others lack most or all of these qualities, and upsets in their fragile political situations could present Communists with good opportunities to gain a position of power. (*Paras. 33, 34, 64-66*)

F. The prospects for the Communist powers in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia over the next several years might best be characterized as "more of the same." The generally low state of the local Communist parties is likely to persist, although the presence and influence of the Communist countries will expand. The influence of Marxism is likely to increase, particularly in those states following a socialist path. The Chinese will also be more active, although much of their effort will be directed against the Soviets, thus inhibiting Communist progress. We recognize that in some places situations could develop so as to provide promising opportunities for the Communists to come to power; nevertheless, we cannot specifically identify any such situation and—all things considered—doubt that any country of the area will come under Communist control. We believe that the forces of nationalism in the area will remain strong, and that nationalist leaders will continue, by and large successfully, to play off East against West. (*Paras. 56, 57, 67, 69*)

G. Two sorts of development could give the Communists a considerable victory. The first, essentially unpredictable, is the emergence of a leader who decided to take his country into the Communist world, either rapidly like Castro, or by stages. Another would arise from a successful Soviet or Chinese effort to achieve a complete and continuing identity of interests with the nationalist forces of the "Third World." As long as this identity remains negative, devoted to eliminating special Western positions and the like, it will be troublesome, sometimes serious, but not fatal. But if these nationalist forces came to believe that the Western powers, and especially the US, were fundamentally opposed to their desire for national independence and domestic progress, the opportunities for the Communist powers to achieve a fundamental gain in the "Third World" would go up sharply. Countries which felt they had no other way to turn would be under very strong pressures to enter upon still closer collaboration with the Communist world. (*Paras. 67-68*)

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DISCUSSION

I. THE SETTING

1. In the years since the end of World War II, the USSR has turned outward from its concentration on building "socialism in one country." It has emerged as a powerful industrialized nation and has come to play an international role consonant with its military and economic power. It has reasserted historic Russian interests which had not been pressed in any such fashion since before the Revolution of 1917. Moscow has expanded its diplomatic and commercial relations the world over, and has entered into a competition with the US and the West for position and influence. In the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, this Soviet drive has coincided with a resurgence of nationalism and an area-wide drive for independence from European colonial rule and special influence. The Soviet Union and many of the emerging nations have found a congruence of interest in reducing and eliminating special Western positions.

2. In consequence, the USSR has made great progress in projecting its influence in the area; nationalist forces, provided for the first time with an alternative to traditional Western suppliers and markets, have thus had greater freedom of maneuver, and the Soviets have been able to exploit local situations to their advantage. Soviet and—within the limits posed by their far smaller capabilities—Chinese Communist penetration has been assisted also by another aspect of nationalism—the widespread emergence of movements protesting the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small ruling class.

3. Until 1954, however, Communist activity in the area under discussion was limited, as it was in most of the world outside of Europe and the Far East. The Soviets (and some other Bloc countries) maintained diplomatic relations wherever possible. In 1955, the USSR had official missions in only 12 of the countries we are dealing with in this estimate. The Soviets were making some efforts to promote local Communist parties, were founding front organizations, and were conducting propaganda efforts. In most cases, the Communist parties were too small and too poorly organized to achieve much by themselves, and Soviet policy opposed "national front" techniques. In the instances where Moscow supported local Communist efforts to seize power by violence, e.g., India and Greece, the efforts failed, and the failure damaged the standing and prospects of the local parties.

4. Following the death of Stalin, the Soviet leaders began to look on the newly independent countries not as hostile bourgeois states but as potentially useful instruments or allies in the Soviet conflict with the West. Every sovereign state but one (Saudi Arabia) has established diplomatic relations with Moscow, and more than half recognize Communist China. (See map, page 5.) East European countries have ridden into the area on Soviet coattails, although Yugo-

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

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slavia has achieved wide acceptance on its own. Soviet cultural, commercial, and propaganda activities have followed in the wake of diplomatic relations. Economic and military assistance to countries in this area accounts for about 65 percent of the total Soviet foreign aid effort.

II. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

5. Looking at the area after the death of Stalin, the Soviets believed that anti-colonial animosities, certain local disputes, and desires for economic advance were such that Soviet aid and political support could accelerate developments in favor of both Soviet interests and those of local Communists. At the same time, the Soviet leaders probably saw an opportunity to check US progress in establishing military facilities and treaty relationships. As one country after another accepted Soviet aid and adopted neutralist and even pro-Soviet postures in international matters, Soviet confidence in the success of these tactics grew. Beginning about 1959, however, Moscow undertook a critical reappraisal. Soviet actions were neither winning countries quickly to alignment with the Bloc, nor were they advancing the interests of domestic Communist movements. The need for reappraisal was sharpened by anti-Communist moves in several Arab states and by the emerging Sino-Soviet dispute.

6. Soviet policy in recent years has reflected a recognition that the struggle in this area will be a long one and that the widely differing types of regime and society require a variety of approaches. This has been reflected in the development of new and interrelated concepts—first "national democracy" and then "revolutionary democracy"—which defined the "progressive" political role of radical leaders and provided the Soviets with an ideological rationalization for dealing with them. The former was intended as a device by which Communists could gradually move into government roles and, ultimately, assume control. "Revolutionary democracy" went one step further: it has allowed such leaders as Nasser and Ben Bella to associate themselves with the Communist world without adopting Communist patterns of government or even necessarily accepting any important degree of influence by domestic Communists. In several Arab countries, this approach has involved playing down the Communist movement and encouraging local Communists to join and work within the ruling single party. In effect, Moscow accepted the view that if effective revolutionary movements developed outside of Communist party control, they deserve support and encouragement—even at the expense of local Communists' interests.

7. The long-term goal of the Soviets is to supplant Western with Communist influence, leading in time to a Moscow-oriented Communist political, economic, and social system. Over the period of this estimate, their goals are more limited. The Soviets are trying to erode Western positions, to make their own ideas and techniques accepted in the area. They are, of course, interested in disrupting Greece's and Turkey's relations with NATO and eliminating Western bases and facilities in the area. They seek to establish ever closer ties with key countries—Algeria, the UAR, India. They have little hope that local Communists will come to power soon, either through development of a mass movement or through

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coup d'etat, and they might find an avowedly Communist regime to be a tactical encumbrance. Rather they are working to bring nationalist regimes progressively into such close association with Moscow that a reversal of the trend becomes virtually impossible. The Soviets do not appear to be seeking military bases, but they certainly recognize that the denial of a given area to Western forces works to their own military advantage. Moreover, the establishment of airlines and other communication facilities helps the Soviets give support to revolutionary groups, as it has already in Africa.

8. Aside from their contest with India for advantage along the Himalayan mountain spine, the Chinese were hardly active in the area until a few years ago when the Sino-Soviet split became acute. They did back the Algerian rebels against France with arms and diplomatic support. Since Chou En-lai's trip through the Middle East and Africa in 1963, Peiping has worked hard to gain wider acceptance and influence. The Chinese do not accept the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism as the Soviets do, and tend as a result to look for radical movements and truly revolutionary situations to exploit. Where such developments are unlikely, they are willing to use conventional aid and diplomatic instruments to further Chinese interests. Although the Chinese and the Soviets are both pursuing the short-range goal of expelling Western interests and presence, their methods differ and their respective interests are coming into increasing conflict. This competition interferes with their efforts to guide the Afro-Asians toward communism and limits to some extent the effectiveness of their policies against Western interests.

III. MEANS AND METHODS

9. Exploitation of anti-colonial resentments is a major feature of the Communist world's approach to the area. These sentiments generally lie close to the surface; the populations of most of these countries are inclined to blame their history of subjection to Western powers for much that is wrong with their own society. It is remarkably easy for the various Communist powers to take advantage of this by associating themselves, through their propaganda and their positions in the UN, with the deeply felt antipathy to colonialism, Western bases, and other special interests. The Communists have also made use of a variety of Afro-Asian and similar international organizations, many of which they control or greatly influence.[2] Both the Soviets and the Chinese have worked to get these institutions to take an extreme anti-Western line, though in recent years Sino-Soviet hostility has antagonized some members and reduced Communist effectiveness.

10. The Communist countries generally see their cause advanced not only by the reduction of colonialist influence but also by the decline or fall of indigenous conservative regimes, monarchical or otherwise. The current label

[2] Some of the more important are the World Peace Council, the International Union of Students, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

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for both anti-colonial and anti-conservative activities is "National Liberation Movement." Under this designation, Moscow has given direct support to republican Yemen and has permitted the UAR and Iraq to pass on Soviet weapons to terrorists in Aden and rebels in Oman.

11. The Soviets have also shown themselves willing to take sides in local quarrels, especially those between "progressive" and "reactionary" (i.e., Western-oriented) states. Moscow has often decided that more is to be gained by supporting one contestant than by trying to remain on good terms with two. In South Asia, the USSR has consistently supported India and Afghanistan against Pakistan in the disputes regarding Kashmir and Pushtunistan. The Soviets have backed the Arabs against the Israelis, though not to the point of being willing to actively support an all-out effort to "liberate Palestine."

12. Their ability to take sides is becoming increasingly limited, however, as their range of interests in the area widens, and particularly as they see opportunities to court such nations as Turkey and Pakistan, which seek to broaden their international ties. In nearly four years of intermittent and often bloody struggle with Baghdad, the Kurdish cause has received steady support on the "clandestine" radios broadcasting from Eastern Europe, but precious little else. Except for the first months of Baathist rule, Moscow has felt its interests were served by maintaining good relations with the Iraqi Government—and supplying the weapons and ammunition used to combat the Kurds. The Soviets have seen little benefit for themselves in the Arab unity movement; Moscow's relations with Nasser have been complicated by its support of Iraq under Qasim and of Syria after the breakaway from the UAR. Moscow, despite Pakistan's unhappiness at US military assistance for India, cannot offer arms to Pakistan without undercutting its position in New Delhi.

Military Assistance

13. A primary feature of the Communist drive has been the sale of military equipment on favorable terms to countries which have asked for it, a process begun with the sale of arms to Egypt in 1955. The Soviets are relatively unconcerned with area stability and feel little responsibility for keeping the peace between antagonists. Hence, they have been forthcoming as to the types and quantities of equipment they are willing to supply, have responded fairly quickly to requests for help, and have imposed no formal restrictions on use of arms. The Soviets perceive in military aid certain particular advantages which economic assistance does not provide. At modest cost, Moscow can serve as sole supplier to an underdeveloped country which has been unable to procure elsewhere the type or quantity of arms it desires. Even more than economic aid, arms assistance offers an opportunity to establish a continuing dependence on the Bloc because of the recipients' need for training, spare parts, and technical support. Moreover, arms programs enable the Communist countries to establish a relationship with an elite which is likely to have an important part in the future politics of the recipient country.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

MAJOR ITEMS OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT
(Figures refer to deliveries made from 1955 through June 1965, not to current holdings.)

	Afghanistan	Algeria	Cyprus	India	Iraq	Morocco	Syria	UAR	Yemen
Land Armaments									
JS 3 heavy tanks	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	60	..
T–34 medium tank	220	101	32	..	80	..	250	516	120
T–54 medium tank		154	..	..	300	42	150	300	
SU–100, self-propelled assault gun	18	25	..	..	120	..	90	200	65
PT–76 amphibious light tank	..	..	..	67	..	..	..	20	..
Personnel carriers armored and amphibious	62	100	30	..	500	..	450	770	155
Artillery Pieces-field, anti-tank, anti-aircraft	600	500	120	..	800	90	650	1,300	460
Naval Vessels									
Destroyers	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	..
Submarines	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	..
Minesweepers	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	6	..
Subchasers	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	6	..
Motor Torpedo Boats	..	6	6	..	12	..	15	25	..
'Komar' Class Guided Missile Boats	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	8	..
Other, Including Auxiliary and Landing craft	..	2	..	..	7	..	..	5	3
Aircraft									
TU–16 Medium jet bomber	..	..	..	..	10	..	..	20 [a]	..
Il–28 light jet bomber	30–40	12	..	..	15	..	7	50	..
MIG–21 fighter	..	9	..	12	16	..	30	102	..
MIG–19 fighter		..	..	..	16	..	..	83	..
MIG–15/17 fighter	125	34	..	..	44	12	46	145	..
AN–12 heavy transport	..	5–8	..	32	3	..	..	20 [b]	..
Other: helicopters, trainers, non-jet combat, etc	92	32	..	76	74	5	59	254	55
Surface-to-air Missile (SA–2) sites [c]	some missiles	..	some equipment	11	[d]	..	..	23	..

[a] We have evidence for delivery of 20 TU–16s, but 25 different aircraft numbers have been sighted in the UAR.
[b] Five of these are Soviet aircraft on loan to the UAR.
[c] Each firing site includes 6 launchers, with 4 missiles per launcher.
[d] Iraq purchased some SA–2s in 1961, but they were subsequently returned to Soviet custody, and shipped to the UAR.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

14. The USSR and its European associates have provided military aid to nine countries in the area.[3] Most of it has been supplied at discounts of a third to a half of established list prices, and payments have usually been spread out over several years. Of the total $2.5 billion worth of arms that the Bloc has supplied to countries in the area, over $1 billion have gone to the UAR, and for this, the UAR has had to pay only about $500 million. Other major recipients have been Syria, Iraq, India, Yemen, Algeria, and Afghanistan. In all these cases—except India—Soviet military equipment has become the standard for the armed forces involved. While the bulk of it has gone to countries with foreign policies or political institutions having some degree of harmony with Moscow's, the USSR has also been willing to sell military hardware to Cyprus and to such regimes as that of the late Imam of Yemen and of King Hasan in Morocco.

VALUE OF COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE
1955–June 1965

(Dollar values are derived from list prices specified in agreements where these are known, or by analogy with these prices in other cases.)

Million US $

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Afghanistan	215	202	13	
Algeria	123	110	1	12
Cyprus	14	14		
India	293	293		
Iraq	378	378		
Morocco	11	11		
Syria	337	302	35	
United Arab Republic	1,100	885 [a]	215	
Yemen	88	60	28	
	2,559	2,255	292	12

[a] The UAR concluded a new arms agreement with the USSR in late 1964. We believe it to be large but we have no information as yet to indicate its value.

Economic Aid

15. Since 1954, Moscow and its European associates have extended nearly $5 billion in economic credits and grants to countries in the area, of which about $1.8 billion has been utilized to date. India and the UAR together have gotten almost 60 percent of total extensions in the area. Other principal beneficiaries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria. The Soviets have gone in for a wide variety of aid projects—railroads, ports, roads, schools, and industrial installations ranging from steel mills to factories for light bulbs. Soviet aid is directed

[3] Chinese military aid has been limited to about $12 million worth of arms supplied to Algeria during the struggle for independence. China may also have agreed to furnish arms to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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to public sector enterprises which, Moscow believes, further the development of socialism in the recipient country. An important part of the Soviet and East European economic aid program is the provision of technical assistance. In the past 10 years, an estimated 45,000 economic technicians have been employed in the area, of whom about 10,000 were present during the last half of 1964. During the same period, some 7,000 trainees went to the USSR and East European countries for various types of technical training.

16. Communist China has provided aid on a far smaller scale. Its extensions to eight countries have amounted to $357 million, of which less than $50 million has been utilized, almost entirely in Yemen, Ceylon, and Nepal. Peiping's share of economic technicians and trainees has been correspondingly small.

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID
January 1954–June 1965

Million US $

	EXTENDED				DRAWN			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Middle East	2,228	1,452	633	143	647	492	133	22
Cyprus	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Iran	70	39	31	0	8	2	6	0
Iraq	218	184	34	0	102	102	0	0
Syrian Arab Republic	216	150	50	16	63	40	23	0
Turkey	16	8	8	0	16	8	8	0
United Arab Republic	1,560	1,011	464	85	415	316	94	5
Yemen	147	60	45	42	42	24	1	17
South Asia	2,295	1,759	364	172	1,091	957	109	25
Afghanistan	646	611	7	28	365	358	7	0
Ceylon	124	31	52	41	26	10	2	14
India	1,299	1,022	277	0	648	548	100	0
Nepal	64	21	0	43	21	10	0	11
Pakistan	162	74	28	60	31	31	0	0
North Africa	402	281	69	52	38	21	15	2
Algeria	304	230	22	52	13	7	4	2
Morocco	17	0	17	0	5	0	5	0
Sudan	33	23	10	0	11	11	0	0
Tunisia	48	28	20	0	9	3	6	0
TOTAL	4,925	3,478	1,066	367	1,776	1,470	257	49

Trade

17. The Communist countries have established commercial relations with nearly all countries of the Middle East and South Asia. While total trade turnover has tripled since 1955 and reached almost $2 billion in 1964, it is heavily concentrated on a few countries and a few commodities. Much of this can be accounted for by a vigorous trade offensive, but a substantial amount results from Soviet willingness to take surplus commodities and to provide goods on long-term credits. Trade and credits are already an important feature of Communist expansion and are likely to become more so. Of the area's trade with

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Communist countries, 45 percent is with East Europe, 40 percent with the USSR, and the remainder with China. India and the UAR account for almost half this trade; other principal participants are Greece, Iran, Syria, and Afghanistan. The share of the total trade of these countries conducted with the Communist nations ranges from 45 percent for Afghanistan and 30 percent for the UAR, down through 15-20 percent for Syria and the Sudan, and 10 percent for India; the involvement of the others falls below this and in many instances is trifling.

18. Since 1960, the USSR and Czechoslovakia have acquired extensive civil air routes in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. (See map, pages 16-17.) They are continuing to develop a substantial international air service network to countries in the area, and through them to sub-Saharan Africa and to Southeast Asia. Though other Communist countries have established some air routes, their development has been limited by insufficient modern aircraft and low traffic potential. Local countries are generally willing to grant routes and landing rights. Soviet shipping is increasing and carries a large proportion of the bilateral trade referred to above. Soviet port improvement and fishery projects in Yemen, Sudan, and the UAR have given Moscow the potential to acquire special facilities for its own trawlers, both legitimate fishing vessels and those used for intelligence collection.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Million US $

Country	USSR		EASTERN EUROPE		COMMUNIST CHINA	
	1955	1964	1955	1964	1955	1964
TOTAL	130.6	793.1	340.9	918.3	147.5	232.3
Afghanistan	24.5	72.0	1.0	12.0	0	N.A.
Algeria	2.4	5.8 [a]	4.3	N.A.	0	N.A.
Ceylon	0.1	35.3	1.8	30.4	42.3	72.2
Cyprus	0	1.8	2.1	6.1	0	N.A.
Greece	4.1	43.2	17.4	80.3	0.1	[b]
India	11.2	301.8	12.5	226.0	27.0	0.1
Iran	37.4	53.3	9.1	40.3	0	0
Iraq	[b]	39.3	5.2	22.1	0.1	19.3
Israel	6.5	0.6	7.4	32.2	[b]	[b]
Jordan	[b]	2.1	2.3	11.8	[b]	2.0
Kuwait	N.A.	[b]	N.A.	2.0 [a]	N.A.	3.0 [a]
Lebanon	1.8	5.8 [a]	6.2	15.0 [a]	0.2	N.A.
Libya	0	5.1	0.3	7.6	0	1.7
Morocco	1.8	17.7	11.4	41.2	19.0	29.8
Nepal	0	1.1 [a]	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Pakistan	0.1	12.5	8.2	10.3	32.1	21.1
Saudi Arabia	0	N.A.	0	N.A.	0	N.A.
Syria	0.2	18.8	6.6	43.7	0.4	28.2
Sudan	0.1	11.4	7.1	32.1	0.9	10.5
Tunisia	0.1	3.9	2.0	19.6	0	0.5
Turkey	13.5	17.4	146.4	59.8	0	0
United Arab Republic	26.8	139.3	89.6	225.8	25.4	43.9
Yemen	0	4.9 [a]	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

[a] 1963; latest figures available.
[b] Less than $50,000.

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Cultural Relations

19. The Soviet Union devotes considerable effort to educational, cultural, and propaganda activities. China is also increasing its activity in these fields and has equalled or surpassed the Soviets in a few places—notably Pakistan and Ceylon—where it had special access or interest. More than half the countries in the area have concluded cultural agreements with one or more Communist countries. These may provide for any or all of the following—exchange of delegations, performers, exhibits, and teachers, import of books at very low prices, and arrangements for scholarship study in the Communist world. The Soviet news agency, TASS, has offices in virtually every country in the area, while the New China News Agency has offices in about half the countries. (See map, page 5.) Radio broadcasting by the Communist countries, in local or commonly used languages, has trebled since 1955 to nearly 700 hours a week.

20. Communist propaganda, coming from countries with no history of colonial domination in the area, emphasizes interests and attitudes which are at least superficially congruent. Consequently, in most countries relatively few impediments are placed in the way of cultural and information activities, and themes of anti-imperialism and Communist progress go over fairly well. The Communist countries have cultural centers in more than two-thirds of the countries of the area, ranging in number from 17 in India to one in Pakistan, in the UAR, and in Iran. Some 8,000 students from the area have taken academic training in Communist countries. While some return disaffected with their experiences, and while the total number is small in comparison with the tens of thousands educated in the West, such education serves to spread Communist political and economic ideas in the area. The number of students entering Bloc universities has declined sharply from a peak of several thousand in 1961 and 1962. Students are generally selected through the mechanism of cultural agreements, but many, especially those from countries hostile to the Bloc, are picked up semi-clandestinely when they run out of funds in Western Europe or through the international youth and student front mechanisms.

Communist Movements

21. Domestic Communist movements run the gamut from legal parties of some size—as in India, Cyprus, and Israel—to small numbers of Communists, insufficient to form a party—as in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In much of the area, Communist parties are repressed and kept off balance by government harassment. In only a few countries—India, Cyprus, and Greece—do the domestic Communist movements rank as important nationwide political forces. Elsewhere, their power derives from the fact that they are better organized than most competing movements. This has enabled the Communists to survive repression and, on occasion, to seize opportunities presented by political upheaval. Such was the case in 1959 under Qasim in Iraq and in the Sudan in late 1964.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE AREA

Country	Name(s)	Membership [a]	Allegiance	Comments	Other organizations controlled by party [b]
Afghanistan					
Algeria	Algerian Communist Party (PCA)	Small	Moscow	Little, if any, activity. Banned in 1962; FLN has established party relationships to CPSU, and some PCA members have been accepted into the FLN.	
Ceylon	(1) CP of Ceylon	1,000	Moscow	4 Members of parliament.	
	(2) CP of Ceylon	Few	Peiping		
	(3) Lanka Sama Samaja Party	3,000	Trotskyite	10 Members of parliament.	
	(4) Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary)	300	Trotskyite		
Cyprus	Reform Party of the Working People (AKEL)	13,900 (as of 1963)	Moscow	PEO has 37,000 and 5,000 AKEL members. EDON has 20,000. But 11,000 PEO also in EDON.	Pancyprian Labor Federation (PEO). United Democratic Youth Organization (EDON).
Greece	CP of Greece (KKE)	31,000 plus 7,000–10,000 activists among Greeks in exile in Eastern Europe and the USSR.	Moscow, but with a pro-Chinese faction.	Illegal. Leaders in exile	United Democratic Left, (EDA). Democratic Syndicalist Movement.
India	(1) CP of India (Right)	70,000	Moscow	22 seats in National Parliament	All-India Trade Union Congress.
	(2) CP of India (Left)	85,000	Peiping	Many top leaders in jail. 11 seats in National Parliament.	All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Front).
Iran	Tudeh (People's) Party of Iran.	200 + in Iran, several hundred in exile.	Moscow	Illegal. Leadership in Leipzig.	
Iraq	Communist Party of Iraq	2,500	Moscow, but has pro-Chinese adherents.	Illegal. Some leaders in jail, some abroad, some underground.	
Israel	Maki (CP of Israel)	1,800	Moscow	5 Members of parliament. Gets much Arab protest vote.	
Kuwait	No organized party			Some non-Kuwaiti Communists known to meet.	

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Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE AREA (*Continued*)

Country	Name(s)	Membership [a]	Allegiance	Comments	Other organizations controlled by party [b]
Jordan	CP of Jordan	200–1,500		Many leaders in jail, some abroad.	
Lebanon	CP of Lebanon		Old top leaders hew close to Soviet line. Younger, second echelon want more independence.	Quasi-legal, allowed to publish, meet, and participate in election.	
	Socialist Revolutionary Party.	Unknown	Peiping.		
Libya	No organized party				
Morocco	Moroccan CP	1,000–4,000		Illegal; limited youth and student activity is carried on.	
Nepal	(1) CP Nepal-"moderate"	Up to a few thousand.	Moscow	Quasi-legal.	
	(2) CP Nepal-"extremist"		Moscow	Illegal. Leaders in India.	
Pakistan	CP of East Pakistan	1,500–3,000	Split	Illegal.	
Saudi Arabia	No organized party				
Sudan	Sudan CP	2,500	Moscow	*De facto* legality since November 1964. Party divided into hard and soft line over political tactics.	Railway Workers Union.
Syria	CP of Syria	1,000–4,000	Moscow	Illegal. Long-time Communist leader Khalid Bakdash in exile in Eastern Europe.	
Tunisia	CP of Tunisia	250–500		Illegal. Little discernible activity.	
Turkey	CP of Turkey	Unknown	Moscow	Illegal. Leadership in exile.	
UAR	(1) CP of Egypt	400–1,000	Moscow	Both dissolved in 1965, in favor of Arab Socialist Union.	
	(2) Democratic Movement for National Liberation				
Yemen	No organized party			Illegal.	

[a] These figures are rough estimates, often based on very fragmentary information. We have somewhat more confidence in our figures for Cyprus, India, Israel, and Greece.

[b] Most parties sponsor or attempt to sponsor the usual range of Communist fronts—Partisans of Peace, Youth, Student, and Women's groups, Friendship societies, etc. We list here important organizations other than these.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Soviet and Chicom Economic and Military Assistance



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22. The Communist parties employ a wide variety of tactics, including the infiltration of local organizations and institutions—governments, political parties, student groups, ethnic and religious bodies, labor unions, and security forces. They control important trade unions in India, Sudan, Greece, and Cyprus. Communists have also infiltrated and influenced the National Awami Party in Pakistan. In Greece, the United Democratic Left (EDA), though a legal party which polled 11 percent of the vote in the national elections of 1964, is in fact a front of the outlawed Greek Communist Party (KKE). In the Sudan, the Communist party collaborates with parties and organizations of professional people, youth, and students to oppose the traditional parties. In Algeria and the UAR, the official Communist parties have been dissolved in favor of support of the single socialist party established in each of those countries.

23. The Communist parties in most of the area have been unable to capitalize substantially on the widespread poverty and limited social mobility characteristic of these traditional societies. Hardly anywhere in the area has a modern political party been successful in reaching the peasantry, and this is true also in the case of much of the urban population, which is still strongly tradition-bound. Nevertheless, it is within the urban framework that such parties, including the Communist, seek their principal support. The expansion of education and the growth of industry are gradually eroding traditional attitudes and bringing awareness that change is both possible and desirable. Thus, both the working classes in the towns and the growing educated elements are potential recruiting grounds for modernizing parties. Almost without exception, however, the Communists have emerged a poor second to nationalist, reformist movements in winning support and establishing themselves as the principal modernizing force in developing societies. For the most part, Communist parties have attracted discontented intellectuals and only moderate numbers of workers, often from minority groups.

24. Other factors have also served to limit the usefulness of Communist movements to the Soviet Union. Policy direction from abroad often hurts the local Communist party's image and sometimes creates suspicions of Soviet motives among local leaders. Communist hostility toward religion is a detriment where religious beliefs are still strong. Factionalism has been a prominent feature of Communist parties in the area for several decades; it has increased as the Sino-Soviet split has deepened and as the Chinese have begun to work actively within the parties. In a number of parties, some factions have adopted the Chinese line, at least in part as a tactic to work against long established Communist leaders. In India and Ceylon, the local parties have split into two organizations. In Algeria, Cyprus, and India, the local parties stood apart from independence struggles and thereby damaged their standing with the nationalist forces. Narrow personal involvement of some leaders, e.g., Khalid Bakdash, has hurt Arab communism.

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25. While these problems and errors have by no means eliminated the value of the local movements to Moscow, they have limited their usefulness and progress, especially when they have revealed basic conflicts between the aims of communism and local nationalism. Indeed, the low estate of the Communist movements and parties throughout much of the area has been a major factor in the realignment of Soviet tactical objectives; the shift from attempts to gain power "from below" by developing a mass organization, in favor of attempts to infiltrate ongoing revolutionary movements "from above" by the tactics of "national democracy" and "revolutionary democracy."

The Covert Mechanism

26. For the formulation and execution of policy, the Soviets and the Chinese each have a highly integrated party and governmental apparatus. Moreover, the conspiratorial background and nature of Communist organization tend to make clandestine activity fit well into their overseas activities. The Soviet intelligence services, the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), play a wide role in carrying out foreign policy.[4] The KGB does a substantial amount of work in reporting and in influencing local officialdom. The KGB also plays an important role in the effort to gain influence and control over the persons and groups who dominate local political life.

27. Our information on the numbers and activities of the services in the area is necessarily incomplete. Of the 1,917 Soviet officials known to be in the area at the beginning of 1965—exclusive of military and economic technicians—we can positively identify 211 as intelligence personnel. On the basis of established criteria, a further 235 are suspected of being intelligence personnel. The actual number is probably considerably larger; we know from KGB and GRU defectors and from analysis of Soviet installations in areas where more evidence is available that more than half of Soviet official personnel abroad—exclusive of military and economic technicians—are intelligence officers.

28. Soviet intelligence officers are heavily concentrated in diplomatic missions. In those countries of the area where our coverage of Soviet embassies is most extensive, the known and suspect intelligence officers often occupy over two-thirds of the diplomatic positions. Such ratios obtain in Soviet diplomatic installations the world over. Moreover, Soviet intelligence officers fill most of the principal positions in such embassies, sometimes including that of ambassador and almost always those of the chiefs of the political, economic, and other sections. The services also use other Soviet government organs—TASS, Aeroflot, military missions, etc.,—as cover for clandestine operations. Economic aid missions provide some cover for clandestine activities, though the specialized work done and the isolated lives of most technicians argue against extensive use of them for such purposes.

[4] In Communist usage, "intelligence" implies, to a far greater degree than in Western parlance or practice, clandestine or subversive activity. The Soviet Intelligence Services are described in more detail in the Annex.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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29. Analysis of Soviet covert operations in the area, based on evidence which ranges from extensive and intensive surveillance of a Soviet embassy in an Arab country, through fairly good observation in several other countries, down to minimal coverage of the remainder, brings out discernible patterns of activity and of principal targets at which the Soviet intelligence services work. We know from defectors that the Soviets place considerable stress on the recruitment of assets able to influence or control the policies of local governments, political parties, and the like. The Soviets put great effort into influencing, buying, and subverting the press. They naturally do more where the press is relatively free of government control, as in Lebanon or India, but are very active even in countries where it is not. The Soviets work consistently to penetrate US installations, both diplomatic and military, and to discredit US policies, often by planting false intelligence and circulating forgeries purporting to be US Government documents. They mount operations aimed at developing sources of intelligence within the government and security services of the host countries. Finally, they attempt to monitor, support, and control local Communist leadership.

30. The Eastern European countries also undertake clandestine operations in this area. Their services are small by comparison with those of the Soviets, seem to be fairly limited in their activity, and very often work quite closely with the Russians. The little evidence at our disposal indicates that they work against emigre groups of their own nationality and in some cases collect information on local governments. We have no evidence indicating efforts of Eastern European countries to acquire controlled press assets.

31. In various areas of the world, Communist China conducts a pattern of clandestine activities, including covert intelligence collection, political subversion, and the promotion of pro-Peiping Communist parties or factions. Covert intelligence collection is handled basically by two intelligence services: the Intelligence Department of the armed forces and the Investigation Department of the Communist Party. The other clandestine activities are conducted by other components of the Communist Party. In the area covered by this estimate, our knowledge of specific Chinese Communist clandestine activity is sparse but the general pattern would seem to be the same. There is no evidence of cooperation between the Soviets and the Chinese in clandestine matters.

32. It is impossible to make a very thorough assessment of Soviet intelligence successes and failures. We do, however, have evidence that Soviet efforts in respect of the press have had a good deal of success. Controlled press assets or overtly Communist papers are fairly numerous in certain countries, particularly India, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, Algeria, and Ceylon. Assets of both types include the well-edited Indian weekly, *Link*, the Lebanese newspapers *Al-Akhbar* and *Al-Nida*, and the Cypriot *Haravghi*. We have good evidence of Soviet recruitment of several people who have occupied senior government positions while working for the Soviets. They include a former foreign minister of

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

one state, a former ambassador of another, and a sensitively placed military officer of a third. The Soviets—or their East European allies—have had several successful recruitments in Israel, including an agent who held Ben Gurion's confidence for five years. There have also been a number of successful Soviet recruitments of lower level assets in a variety of countries. We must assume that the Soviets have other successful operations of which we do not know. All things considered, we believe that the Soviets have been fairly successful in mounting covert operations.

IV. COMMUNIST PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

33. In particular countries, the Communist powers have gained entree, influence, and leverage by military and economic aid and by support on issues of great importance to that country. The tactics of promoting nonalignment, encouraging nationalist feeling, and moving to aid revolutionary regimes with arms and economic aid, have given the Soviets a sizable measure of prestige and influence in a number of countries. Six armies in the area are largely or totally equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods. By such moves as denying military spares, the USSR has some potential to exert leverage on those countries which look to it for aid. The expanded Soviet presence has given the Soviets good opportunities to acquire clandestine assets.

34. We believe, however, that the vast majority of actions and decisions by area governments which in one way or another favor Communist aims are the result of deeply held beliefs in nonalignment as a valid national policy, of anti-Western prejudices stemming from the era of colonial rule, of predilections for an authoritarian socialist system, and of admiration for the rapid economic advance of the Communist countries. On occasion, clandestine Soviet assets have apparently been able to influence their governments' policies in ways favorable to the Soviets. There are other prominent figures—Khalid Muhyi-al-Din in Cairo, Dr. Lyssarides in Nicosia, for example—who habitually advocate policies congenial to the USSR. However, in no case is there evidence to suggest that either Moscow or Peiping can get a specific decision of major importance made on command. Nevertheless, the Soviets through their overall activities are able to exercise a degree of influence on a number of area governments.

South Asia

35. In *India,* both the Soviet Union and China enjoyed an upsurge of popularity in the middle 1950s, when Khrushchev and Chou En-lai proclaimed their interest in coexistence, mounted major political and propaganda programs, and, in the Soviet case, extended large amounts of economic aid. The Chinese gains were lost as the border conflict developed between 1959 and 1962, and Chinese influence now is confined to a part of the Left Communist Party of India. The Soviets, on the other hand, have used a growing and well publicized aid program plus support for India on international issues—most prominently Kash-

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mir—to gain substantial good will within India. Their open break with the Chinese has further contributed to this good will and permitted them greater latitude in courting India.

36. India will remain among the more moderate members of the Afro-Asian world. The influence of any foreign country will be limited by India's determination to pursue its national interests as it sees them. India will continue to recognize its heavy dependence on the West. Nevertheless, New Delhi will place high value on Soviet military and economic aid and on Soviet support in its difficulties with China and Pakistan. Thus, India will take care to avoid antagonizing the USSR, and its public postures on international issues will often coincide with those of the Soviets.

37. The Soviets have not been able to translate the good will they have won into any substantial influence on the domestic politics of India. Soviet industrial assistance has been of great assistance to India in carrying out its plans for expanding the public sector. The Communist movement, although it has gotten as much as 10 percent of the vote in past elections, and maintains substantial influence in the trade union movement, has been weakened by the split into two parties. Indian Communists, particularly those on the left, appear to be moving toward a stronger anti-government line, but they cannot carry such actions very far lest the security forces crack down on them still further. There is little prospect of either Indian Communist party achieving any major national gains in the next several years.

38. The situation of the two Communist powers with regard to *Pakistan* is almost the reverse. The Soviet Union has made very little progress since it has chosen to identify itself with Pakistan's rivals, Afghanistan and India, in the disputes over Pushtunistan and Kashmir. China has capitalized skillfully on Pakistan's reaction to the US military aid program for India and has been willing to give at least the appearance of support to Pakistani security interests. In return, Pakistan has supported a number of Chinese positions in the Afro-Asian context, and the two countries have concluded a border agreement (in the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir) as well as a civil air agreement, and have begun to establish economic and cultural ties, though these are so far minimal. Ayub has generally kept Pakistan's relations with China carefully bounded, and we think he will continue to make this effort. However, there is a danger that Pakistan will miscalculate US tolerance and carry its relationship with Peiping so far as to precipitate a major crisis in US-Pakistani relations. In such a situation, opportunities for the Communist countries to increase their influence in Pakistan could be greatly enhanced.

39. The domestic Communist Party in West Pakistan is insignificant. In East Pakistan, the small, illegal Communist Party works chiefly by exploiting Bengali suspicions of Rawalpindi. A fair number of Communists and sympathizers have joined and exercise influence in the National Awami Party. They trade on the massive poverty, student discontent, and general political negativism characteristic of Bengali political life. However, Ayub is firmly in control of Pakistan,

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

and his domestic policies are designed to minimize the weaknesses out of which a Communist threat could grow. We see no significant Communist threat developing at least for some years to come.

40. Though *Ceylon* is now ruled by a pro-Western government, there is considerable potential for Communist advance, despite the splits within the Marxist movement. The government lacks a firm parliamentary majority, and the opposition—led by the former Prime Minister, Madame Bandaranaike—seems to be increasing its radical and leftist orientation. Indeed, during its last six months in office, the Bandaranaike government included representatives of the Trotskyite party in prominent roles. The present anti-Communist government is faced with economic problems—inflation, depleted exchange reserves, unemployment—which will plague Ceylon for a long time to come. There is a fair chance that the Bandaranaike government (or one like it) will be returned to power during the next few years. In such an event, Ceylon would almost certainly move toward closer ties with the USSR and with China. Moreover, the influence of the Marxist parties would increase, and they would probably be able to influence the government toward a sweeping program of socialization.

41. Penned into the mountain barrier between China and India, *Nepal* has little choice but to play one side against the other. It has pursued this tactic rather successfully, getting aid from both, and at the same time putting out lines to the US, USSR, Pakistan, and any other country likely to be of help in balancing off its neighbors. The local Communist Party is split, and Chinese efforts have won Peiping some sympathizers in the Nepalese Government. We think the King will retain control of the country during the next few years and will continue to play off China and India. However, Nepal is vulnerable to Chinese pressure, the more so because such power as is exercised is concentrated in the King's hands. Moreover, Nepalese suspicions of India might hamper efforts by New Delhi to counter Chinese moves.

42. In *Afghanistan,* the large Soviet military and economic aid effort has helped to open up and change a remote nation in a very short time. The Afghan armed forces are almost entirely Soviet-equipped, and nearly half of the country's foreign trade is with the USSR. Moreover, Afghanistan, while independent and proclaiming a neutral foreign policy, in practice sides with the Soviets on many international issues. Significantly, however, the political liberalization measures of the past two years have been in the direction of Western patterns, rather than of a one-party socialist ideology, though political power in Afghanistan still remains largely in the hands of the King.

43. The massive Soviet aid program, plus the increasing trade ties, will probably continue to keep the relationship between Kabul and Moscow close. In the immediate future, the Soviets probably will have little incentive to risk disruption of this favorable situation by overplaying their hand. However, Afghanistan's efforts at modernization, particularly in the political field, will almost certainly lead to serious strains in the society. Such circumstances could present opportunities for the USSR to use its presence and influence to shape the course of events. Chinese influence has been and is likely to remain minimal.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

The Arab World

44. Arab resentments over European dominance and at Western support for Israel have presented the Communist countries with opportunities. Nationalist feeling is widespread and is directed at eliminating the vestiges of Western special interests—e.g., military bases, British dominance in portions of the Arabian Peninsula, and Western control of the oil industry. The UK-French-Israeli attack on Suez in 1956 is still fresh in the minds of the Arabs, and even moderate elements suspect the West of meddling in area politics. In most Arab countries, the political leadership devolves on one man, and those who have emerged as the new leaders have been disposed to try to play the Soviet Union off against the West. Finally, the Arab states are experiencing considerable difficulty in evolving political and economic systems which combine modernization with their own cultural traditions. Some of the modernizing elements in the area have come to regard Yugoslavia as a state which is making substantial progress in development through authoritarian and socialist means and at the same time maintaining its independence from Soviet domination.

45. Soviet influence is strongest in the *UAR*. It has been built on Soviet willingness to provide substantial and continuing supplies of arms and large-scale assistance in economic development, and on shared interests in promoting revolutionary governments and cutting down Western influence in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviets are the source of almost all the UAR's armaments and so have the capability, should they choose to exercise it, of hampering Nasser militarily by withholding spares and ammunition—albeit at considerable political cost. In terms of state-to-state relationships and international affairs, Soviet prestige is high in Cairo.

46. Cairo is host to the secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), which is heavily supported by Communist countries, and to a number of other radical organizations. Moreover, Cairo has ambitions to play a leading role in African affairs. The USSR's military aid has enabled the UAR to intervene in such places as Yemen and the Congo much more effectively than it could otherwise have done. The Soviets have not only encouraged Nasser to transfer Soviet arms previously delivered to him, but they have on occasion used the UAR as a conduit and transshipment point for their own supply to third parties. At other times, they have supplied arms directly to other countries in the area.

47. Nevertheless, Cairo is jealous of its own independence; while it sometimes responds to Soviet pressures, we believe it is determined to resist any significant efforts to undermine its freedom of action. The Chinese have a large official and quasi-official establishment in Cairo, but appear not to have much influence. UAR and Soviet foreign policies are congruent over a wide range of affairs and there is a good deal of willing collaboration, but we have no evidence that any Communist state has the ability to exercise decisive influence on the basic thrust of UAR foreign policy.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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48. For a long time Nasser suppressed the Egyptian Communists, and Moscow put up with this. Nearly all of them were released in 1964. Recently, in line with Moscow's policy of treating certain "socialist" parties as fraternal parties, the Communist Party of Egypt and a second Communist group—both small in size and heavily penetrated by Egyptian security forces—dissolved themselves and ordered their members to seek membership in Nasser's Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Several Communists and Marxists already occupy responsible positions in the ASU and in the government-controlled press. Nasser apparently has little fear that the Communists will take over the ASU and thinks that their organizing ability can contribute to making it more effective. This development clearly offers opportunities for expanded influence on the part of the Communists over the longer term. However, the ASU must overcome many difficult obstacles before it can become an effective political instrument.

49. The emergence of an independent *Algeria* after a bloody war against the French presented attractive opportunities to the Soviets and the Chinese. Under Ben Bella, Algeria showed a willingness to align itself with the Communists on sensitive world issues. Algeria also claimed to be following "scientific socialism," and the CPSU treated the FLN as a fraternal party. Ben Bella's ouster by army chief Boumedienne has been a setback for the Soviets. Boumedienne has declared that his regime will turn its attention to internal affairs, and this is likely to involve a more genuinely nonaligned foreign policy. Among foreign influences, the French will remain the most important, thanks to linguistic and economic ties as well as substantial financial assistance. Nonetheless, Algiers will want to continue to receive Soviet military and economic aid, and it will endeavor to keep good relations with Moscow.

50. The Communist record in the remainder of the Arab world is uneven. The Soviets provide virtually all the military supplies for *Syria* and *Iraq*, and considerable economic aid as well. As a result, they have correct state-to-state relations and a firm presence. Both Syria and Iraq are suspicious of Moscow's close relationship with Nasser, and this tends to limit Soviet influence. The fortunes of the local Communist parties have fluctuated greatly. In Syria before the 1958 union with Egypt, and in Iraq under Qasim, local Communists made spectacular gains. However, these advances were wiped out in subsequent political upheavals, from which the local Communists have not yet recovered. Evidence is appearing that both the Syrian and Iraqi Communist movements are having internal difficulty, due to the efforts of the Chinese to capture or influence them and to internal opposition to Moscow's policy of support for such one-party systems as Nasser's and Ben Bella's.

51. In the *Sudan*, the small and well-organized Communist Party took advantage of the confusion attendant on the collapse of the Abboud regime in October 1964 to get four posts in the first civilian cabinet. However, this thrust alarmed the conservatives; the Communists were forced out and failed to win any seats in the regular parliamentary elections. They are still influential in the labor movement and in the professional organizations; they have won 11 of the 15

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

parliamentary seats allotted to secondary school and university graduates. Sudanese relations with Communist countries are limited to moderate amounts of trade and aid, and Soviet influence is small.

52. In most of the rest of the Arab world—*Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan,* and *Kuwait*—the Communist countries have been able to do little more than establish a diplomatic presence over the past decade. They are unrepresented in *Saudi Arabia,* as well as in *Aden* and other British protected states in the Arabian peninsula. Local Communist parties, where they exist, are small and repressed, and the several rulers are hostile to communism, although Tunisia and Morocco have taken modest amounts of Soviet aid. On the other hand, Soviet and Chinese presence in *Yemen* overshadows that of the West, though so far without noticeable impact on the politically important elements, most of whose energy is spent on working with or against the UAR. *Lebanon* is a center for area-wide Soviet clandestine activity. However, although the local party has scored occasional minor successes, Communist influence on Lebanese government policy is small. A separate, pro-Chinese party has been formed by a small group of Lebanese Communist Party dissidents. *Israel,* a country with a Western political system, tolerates a small, anti-Zionist, legal Communist Party, which has little political or subversive potential.

53. We believe that the Soviets regard their efforts to extend their presence and influence in the Arab world over the past 10 years as having been fairly successful. Their initial hopes of establishing a dominant influence among the nationalists have not been fulfilled and they have on occasion been discomfited by the sudden occurrence of anti-Communist measures. The ouster of Communist-leaning governments in Iraq in 1963 and in Algeria in 1965 have demonstrated to Moscow that local political instability does not always work to their advantage and that they must expect periodic setbacks. Nonetheless, the Soviets have helped the erosion of Western positions and they see in the development and spread of socialist ideologies some potential for manipulating developments in their favor over the long term. Thus we believe that Soviet policy will continue to follow the same lines as in the past several years, stressing military and economic aid, improved relationships, and the acceptability of certain forms of socialism. Moscow will seek where possible to expand influence and leverage, as it recognizes that direct pressure as a way to gain its ends is often self-defeating.

54. Throughout the area, the Communist presence will almost certainly continue to expand, though with limits on the amount of influence that can be exercised, and though developments transcending the area—such as policy changes in Moscow—could affect the trend. We think that Soviet economic and military aid will continue to flow to the countries where they are already established, that the trade of these states with the Communist countries will rise, and that cultural relations and the like will increase. The Soviets are also likely to extend economic aid to conservative regimes such as Jordan. Moreover,

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there is a significant chance that in one or another of the Arab countries where Soviet presence is now limited or even nonexistent, the replacement of a conservative regime by a radical one would result in a rapid growth in Communist influence. Conversely, it is possible that a regime in which the Soviets have invested heavily may be replaced by one less tractable. All things considered, we do not anticipate any decline in the overall Soviet presence, which has become an established element in the affairs of the region.

55. We must assume that Soviet efforts to penetrate and control the military services of the countries for which Moscow is the major arms supplier will continue, but we cannot assess with any confidence the probable degree of success. We assume that Soviets and Chinese will strive, at times successfully, to create assets in government ministries, political parties, and other centers of influence. We think that the Soviets will strive for influence rather than outright control of governments, at least for the next several years. But efforts to cope with, influence, and try to control the growth of types of socialism being developed in such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Syria will be a continuing and difficult task for the Communist powers.

56. We think that socialism in the Arab world will continue to have characteristics distinct from classic communism—limited right of private property and support for religion, for example. However, the international movement itself is growing steadily less dogmatic on such points. The forms of socialism practiced in the UAR and Ba'thist Syria (and at least until recently in Algeria) have been becoming less parochially Arab; this trend will be augmented as relationships are developed between local socialist movements and the CPSU and other Communist parties. At the same time, ideological bonds within the Communist world continue to loosen, as former satellites emphasize nationalism and increased private initiative while the older parties not in power explore compromises suitable to their political circumstances.

57. In time, these processes may converge. As the Arabs draw eclectically from communism as well as other philosophies and methods, their own versions of socialism are likely to end up a hybrid (which may or may not call itself "Communist"). The appeal of such a local ideology, in which communism has been acclimatized and reconciled with nationalism, could be great (although still greatly influenced by the leader or leaders who sponsor it). Substantial increases in membership and influence might ensue. But, although the USSR would greet such developments as major victories, it is far from certain that parties of this character would align their policies with the Soviet Union or China—more, that is, than the normal convergence of interests already described. The net effect of this development would be a nationalism somewhat more noisily anti-Western than before, a tendency to experiment with forms of social and political organization based on Communist-world models, and regimes slightly more vulnerable to bona fide Communist penetration because the distinction between Communists and nationalists would have been lost.

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Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus

58. All these countries except Cyprus have been the object of Russian or Slavic expansionism and, hence, in some measure are conditioned to look on the USSR as a national enemy. This attitude is strongest in Turkey, and only somewhat less so in Greece; it is also deeply embedded in the attitudes of Iran's rulers. However, the deeply discontented in those countries are less affected by such feelings. Rather, they are concerned primarily with altering the economic, social, and political fabric of their own homelands.

59. In response to hostile Soviet policies in the postwar period, Greece, Turkey, and Iran entered into defensive arrangements with the West, but during the past two or three years the Soviet approach to this area has changed considerably and Moscow now seeks to gain acceptance as a "good neighbor." The Soviets have renounced border territorial claims against Iran and Turkey and have accepted partial responsibility for the deterioration of relations that occurred in the postwar period. Thus, US-sponsored regional defensive alliances in the area are now confronted not by the cohesive effect of Soviet hostility and threatened aggression, but by the erosive effect of Soviet "friendship" capitalizing on the emergence of neutralist sentiments and local discontent.

60. The USSR has succeeded in normalizing and improving its relations with *Iran* in recent years. A modest Soviet economic assistance program has begun, and cultural exchanges have increased. However, Iran's foreign policy and its voting record in the UN have generally been responsive to US initiatives. The sizable American presence in Iran, the Western orientation of the regime, and the present arrangements between the US and Iran have made it difficult for the Soviets to acquire significant leverage in the country. But the Iranian system is fragile, and the country's stability rests to a high degree on the Shah. Some Communist activity persists, but the Tudeh Party is effectively suppressed. More importantly, there is considerable discontent among politically conscious elements who feel themselves denied participation in the system. Should the Shah be removed from the scene, Iran would probably become extremely unstable, a situation which the Soviets might have considerable success in exploiting.

61. Neither the USSR nor the local Communists have acquired any significant influence during the past decade in *Greece* or *Turkey*, both of which have valued their NATO membership. In the past year or so, the Soviets have sought to exploit the frustration that all the parties to the Cyprus dispute felt towards the Western powers. They have provided arms to Archbishop Makarios, and have lent qualified support to Ankara's position regarding the Turkish community on Cyprus. This multiple approach has had some success, and has placed strains on NATO ties in the Eastern Mediterranean. There has been a notable increase during the past year of official contacts between Turkey and the USSR, including visits of a type that have not occurred since the 1930s. At the same time, a general relaxation of tensions on the international scene has made rigid alignment with NATO appear less imperative to Athens and Ankara. Accordingly,

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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we think Moscow will continue its present approach. Both Greece and Turkey will come to look for expanded economic relations with the Communist countries. The former, in particular, will probably find the USSR and Eastern Europe willing to buy crops that cannot be sold in the West. Both may be expected on occasion to take foreign policy stands which parallel Soviet ones, but no basic shift in their foreign policies is likely.

62. Both Greece and Turkey are stable societies, have well-developed political systems, and an advanced degree of social cohesion, factors which severely limit opportunity for the Soviets or the local Communists to make substantial advances. The Communist front EDA vote in Greece has declined from a high of 25 percent in 1958 to 11 percent in 1964. Communist voting strength will persist in Greece, but is unlikely to grow significantly save possibly in the event of severe economic difficulties or an extreme and bitter fragmentation of the Center Union. In Turkey, the Communist Party is suppressed and insignificant. Since the 1960 revolution socialism has become more respectable, and this development, combined with pressures for social and economic changes, has led the country a few steps toward the left. Some further moves in this direction are likely, but Turkey almost certainly will not change enough to provide promising opportunities for the USSR or local Communists.

63. *Cyprus* is a rather different matter. The Communist Party of some 13,000 is the largest, in relation to total population, in the area. It is also the only organized political party. The Communists also control a large and effective labor organization as well as an active youth group, and Makarios has accepted Communist political support. The Archbishop is, however, determined that he will be the political power in Cyprus and has contained Communist power when it suited his interests. The presence of some 10,000 mainland Greek troops is a further inhibition upon Communist progress. A settlement of the Cyprus dispute involving union with Greece would leave strong Communist influence in Cyprus itself, but would add relatively little to overall Greek Communist power. If the island remains independent, the local Communists might increase their strength and influence to the point where they could make a serious bid for control when Makarios leaves the scene. The USSR is interested in preventing *enosis*, in supporting the local Cypriot Communists, and in bringing pressure to bear against Western bases and facilities on the island. To this end it has provided substantial military aid, by way of Egypt; the island has also developed economic ties with Communist countries.

V. SUMMING UP

64. We believe that the Communist presence will continue to expand over the next several years, both in numbers of personnel and in activities. The replacement of any conservative, Western-oriented regime by a radical nationalist one would open the way for a program of Soviet military and economic aid. Similarly, a majority vote in the UN for the admission of Peiping or a rise in general sentiment in Peiping's favor among the Afro-Asian group could result in establishment of Chinese embassies in several more countries. There is also

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likely to be an increase in the acceptability of Communist political and economic ideas, and in the use of Marxist terminology; however, the conflict between Marxism and local cultures will continue to inhibit Communist progress. In a few countries, residual European influence is not large and could perhaps be outweighed by that flowing in from the East. However, we think it unlikely that, even in these countries, Western influence would be wholly eliminated. The benefits of maintaining some sort of balance between East and West are certain to continue to appeal strongly to area leaders, who will aim to avoid domination by either party.

65. Differences in tactics between Peiping and Moscow are likely to increase in the area over the next few years, reducing the effectiveness of the two countries' programs and inhibiting the development of local Communist apparatuses. Further splits within local parties are probable as Peiping offers an alternative pole of attraction for radicals and other malcontents. Chinese attempts to prod local groups into aggressive postures and support for such entities as the Palestine Liberation Organization will probably bear some fruit, but in general the area does not lend itself to the more extreme courses that Peiping is likely to advocate. Russian and Chinese national interests are likely to be most in conflict in South Asia, where Soviet military and economic support for India will continue to build up that country's capabilities to oppose the Chinese.

66. Some of the countries we are dealing with e.g., India, Turkey, and Israel—have adequate functioning political systems, sufficiently coherent societies, or strong enough leadership to be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies. They would by no means be invulnerable in the event of a major upheaval, e.g., prolonged depression or a major war. However, they have elements of strength which enable them to tolerate domestic Communist activity or to carry out relations with Moscow without succumbing to Communist blandishments or intrigues. Others lack most or all of these factors of strength, for example, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Though all these regimes have shown a considerable degree of durability and are making significant economic progress, all are made vulnerable by a concentration of power at the top. In each, the sudden demise of one man would probably result in a scramble for political power by a variety of competing forces. Such a tumultous situation would give opportunities for radical elements—including Communists—to seize control of political movements contesting for supremacy.

67. The generally low state of the Communist parties and movements in the area is likely to persist through the period of this estimate. While it is not possible to identify a Communist movement which appears likely to become a national threat in any of the countries of the area, we must note that opportunities for domestic Communists to advance could arise. A related danger lies in the possibility that local political leaders may associate themselves with Communist aims and tactics as a means of achieving personal power or fortune. Individual leaders might even decide to take their countries into the Communist world; either rapidly, like Castro, or by stages. A critical situation of

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this type could arise almost without warning. At this time, however, we can identify no state where it appears likely to happen.

68. A more serious danger lies in the Soviet and Chinese attempt to develop a deep and continuing identity of interests with the nationalist and modernizing forces of the "Third World," both as a means of strengthening their own position and undermining that of the West. As long as this identity of interests remains negative, devoted to eliminating special Western positions and the like, it will be troublesome, occasionally serious, but not fatal. But if these nationalist forces came to believe that the Western powers, and especially the US, were inevitably opposed to their desire for national independence and domestic progress, the opportunities for the Communist powers to achieve a fundamental gain in the "Third World" would go up sharply. Countries which felt they had no other way to turn would be under very strong pressures to enter upon still closer collaboration with the Communist world.

69. The picture we have sketched for the successes and failures of the Communist powers in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia over the next several years might be called "more of the same." On balance we do not believe that the Communists will take over or come to control indirectly any of the countries of the area, but there are some places where situations could develop in such fashion as to provide opportunities for the Communists. We think that the forces of nationalism in the area are strong, and that the political leaders who derive their strength from nationalism will continue, by and large successfully, to play off East against West.

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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ANNEX

THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (RIS)

1. The Soviet intelligence services—KGB and GRU—are technically subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. More important, however, is the relation of the services to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), members of whose Central Committee have always taken a close interest in RIS activities. The current CPSU secretary for police and security affairs is a former chairman of the KGB. The intelligence services, in particular the KGB, play a very prominent role in the Soviet system of government and have provided a ladder for many of their members to high level positions in the Soviet hierarchy, including membership in the CPSU Central Committee.

2. *The KGB.* The First Chief Directorate of this organization is devoted exclusively to clandestine operations abroad; it has eight geographic departments covering the world, except for Eastern Europe, and nine functional components. The geographic departments maintain operational stations (legal residencies) abroad; the Sixth is responsible for Africa and the Seventh for the Near East. Functional components perform such specialties as scientific and technical information, counter-intelligence, liaison with East European services, and work against emigres. Two functional components have no counterpart in Western intelligence practice. One (the "Disinformation" Department) initiates and coordinates operations specifically designed to influence the policies of other governments and to reduce the effectiveness of inimical persons, organizations, or governments. The other employs assassination, kidnapping, sabotage, and certain other activities, such as inciting riots or demonstrations. The Second Chief Directorate operates against diplomats, students, tourists, and other visitors to the USSR. As the general rule it turns over to the First Chief Directorate for continued handling abroad those agents recruited inside the Soviet Union who are returning to their own countries.

3. *The GRU.* Soviet military intelligence is also organized along geographic and functional lines. While its primary mission abroad is the collection of military and related information, the GRU concerns itself with all activities of the armed services in the host country. If local military forces have a potential for political influence—for instance, by participation in coups or revolutions—the GRU is permitted, and has been observed, to engage in operations designed to establish control over politically influential elements of the armed forces. The military intelligence service has the responsibility for strategic sabotage and other paramilitary activities. GRU residencies are run by the

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geographic components and, under a directive of 1961, are headed by a GRU officer under non-military cover and not by the military attache.

4. The Soviet intelligence services are organizations whose professionalism has been developed over a long period. Their ability to recruit, control, and keep agents productive over extended periods of time is attested by such well-known cases as those of the Englishmen Blake and Philby, the Swede Wennerstrom, and the Frenchman Pacques. Within the Soviet Union, the KGB works methodically against targets assessed as potentially useful—particularly against students and diplomats from Western and underdeveloped countries. Testimony from defectors indicates that the Soviet services have considerable success against the Moscow diplomatic installations of these countries, and in recent years have recruited agents from the diplomatic staff of almost all of them. Two particularly successful techniques are straight-forward monetary inducements and blackmail, the latter often based on provocation or fabricated circumstances. Sexual entrapment operations are common; in four recent cases, recruitment approaches have been made to citizens of Middle Eastern countries on the basis of paternity charges arising from sexual indiscretions arranged by the KGB. Homosexual entrapment appears to be used less frequently against Easterners than against Westerners. In heterosexual entrapment, KGB blackmail threats seem more often based on possible legal consequences than upon threats of public disclosure.

5. In areas contiguous to the USSR, ethnic, religious, and linguistic similarities have given the Soviets some advantage over the West. In a number of countries, the Soviets are able to establish effective operations quickly, more quickly than in the sub-Saharan countries where they experience difficulties similar to our own.

6. The overt Soviet presence—diplomatic, trade, information, and the like—provides cover for an extensive clandestine apparatus. The KGB, with the GRU playing a lesser role, acts as the clandestine executive arm of the Soviet party and government in promoting Soviet long-range political goals in underdeveloped countries. Aside from the classic intelligence collection functions, the services conduct operations to denigrate the US and other Western powers, to capture and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and to place individuals in positions in local governments, political parties, and organizations where they can influence policy in Moscow's favor.

7. The KGB and GRU residencies in countries of the area are the dominant factor in the official installations. The KGB has the responsibility for maintaining security over other Soviet nationals, and officers from both services have considerably more personal freedom than other Soviet officials abroad. In the area under discussion, observations of Soviet operational activity indicate that Soviet intelligence officers respond in a highly professional manner to the environment in which they operate. In Turkey, for example, the effectiveness of the local service makes necessary a high standard of tradecraft on the part of the Soviets. In India, on the other hand, the Soviets can operate with relatively few precautions. While Soviet professional standards are generally high, we have observed the Soviets in Libya using routine patterns of meeting and on occasion making recruitment pitches without sufficient assessment of the target's

Approved For Release 2011/01/19 : CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010006-0

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susceptibility. In their operations abroad, the Soviet services have the authority to "co-opt" employees of other Soviet government agencies to assist in clandestine activities. Soviet employees routinely inform the local residency of potential recruits; they may also help develop such potential sources. There are numerous cases on record of the involvement of co-opted agents up to the point of the recruitment attempt.[5]

8. *Identification of RIS Officers.* Soviet intelligence officers whom we categorize as "known" have been identified beyond reasonable doubt, either through identification by defectors from the KGB or GRU or through observation of their agent-handling of other clandestine activities. Defector sources, as well as our own experience, indicate that a "known" intelligence officer seldom abandons his profession to become, for example, exclusively a diplomat, although there are exceptions to this; some Soviet ambassadors with backgrounds in intelligence have become Foreign Ministry officers. The criteria for labeling a Soviet as "suspect" are based on fairly detailed knowledge of the KGB and GRU: their work methods, cover, patterns of assignment, and fields of interest. No single criterion is sufficient to place a Soviet in the "suspect" category, but several taken together will. When we have been able to test our estimates by the testimony of later defectors or other sources, the degree of confirmation has been very high, and there are always several more errors of omission than of misplaced suspicion. Therefore, Soviet officials not identified as "RIS" cannot automatically be assumed to have no intelligence affiliation.

9. Among the criteria used to place a Soviet in the "suspect" category are:

a. inconsistency and lack of continuity in assignment of cover positions; e.g., a Soviet employed by the Military Attache's office at one post may appear as a trade official at another, or a Soviet may arrive at a post as a clerk and become second secretary a few months later, or be two or three grades lower in rank in succeeding posts;

b. repeated divergence of an officer from normal patterns of office hours;

c. frequent association with known RIS officers—almost always KGB with KGB and GRU with GRU. Private parties celebrating the anniversary of the founding of Soviet State Security on 20 December each year offer an opportunity to identify KGB celebrants;

d. possession of or driving an automobile (in these areas); and failure to use diplomatic license plates if entitled to them;

e. extensive association with foreigners;

f. contacts with Communist party, Communist front, and emigre organizations;

g. actions suggestive of intelligence methods of work, such as countersurveillance measures and unusual or frequent travel to locations of intelligence interest.

[5] The dominance of the intelligence services is attested to in many installations where 75% or more of Soviet officials on the diplomatic list are known or suspect intelligence officers. Intelligence officers participate directly in, or are in a position to exploit, all facets of Soviet activity abroad which bring Soviets into contact with foreigners.

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